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LITIGIOUSNESS IN AUSTRALIA: LESSONS 
FROM COMPARATIVE LAW 
LEON WOLFF ∗ 
How litigious are Australians? Although quantitative studies have 
comprehensively debunked the fear of an Australian civil justice system in 
crisis, the literature has yet to address the qualitative public policy question 
of whether Australians are under- or over-using the legal system to resolve 
their disputes. On one view, expressed by the insurance industry, the mass 
media and prominent members of the judiciary, Australia is moving towards 
an American-style hyper-litigiousness. By contrast, Australian popular 
culture paints the typical Australian as culturally averse to formal rights 
assertion. This article explores the comparative law literature on 
litigiousness in two jurisdictions that have attracted significant scholarly 
attention — the United States and Japan. More specifically, it seeks to draw 
lessons from this literature for both understanding litigiousness in modern 
Australia and framing future research projects on the issue.  
To be, or not to be, that is the question: 
Whether ‘tis Nobler in the mind to suffer 
The Slings and Arrows of outrageous Fortune, 
Or to take Arms against a Sea of troubles 
And by opposing end them ... 
The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark,  
First Folio 1623, III.i.56-60  
William Shakespeare 
I INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a modern-day Hamlet. Instead of contemplating whether ‘to be or not 
to be’ in his grief over the death of his father, King Hamlet, suppose he was 
deliberating legal action against his father’s killers for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. ‘To sue, or not to sue’, Hamlet might muse, 
‘that is the question. Is it nobler to suffer the slings and arrows of life’s 
injustices, or take arms — backed by a team of well-paid and highly educated 
lawyers — in a court of law and by litigating end them?’  
                                                 
∗ Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University; Co-director, Australian Network for 
Japanese Law; and Deputy Director, Centre for Law, Governance and Public Policy. 
272 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 2 
To be sure, this is hardly the inspired poetry of Shakespeare’s original play. 
Nor is it a theme as confounding and as universal as struggling over the 
meaning of life, the theme devised by Shakespeare for his original hero. Still, 
21st century Hamlet does articulate a modern-day concern: is resort to law the 
best answer to our woes? Shakespeare, of course, already had his own answer. 
In his play Henry VI, Part II, one of his characters says: ‘The first thing we 
do, let’s kill all the lawyers’.1 Clearly, Shakespeare was questioning the social 
utility of lawyers and litigation. Four hundred years later, there are even more 
lawyers, more judges, more statutes, more cases — indeed, more law. Is it, as 
Shakespeare himself might have concluded, too much? 
Comparative law provides mixed answers to modern-day Hamlet’s dilemma. 
Modern democracies need a robust civil justice system to hear and resolve 
legal disputes. After all, the rule of law — much like democracy and the 
separation of powers — is a cherished value in most systems of government 
around the globe. But overuse or underuse of the legal system may indicate a 
social problem. This is where the debate on litigation takes different twists 
and turns depending on the jurisdiction under the spotlight. Two jurisdictions, 
the United States and Japan, have occupied a significant corpus of 
comparative law analysis on the issue of litigiousness, albeit for different 
reasons. In the United States, the concern is whether Americans sue too 
readily.2 In Japan, it is that Japanese people are too reluctant to invoke the 
law to protect their rights.3  
But what about Australia? Are Australians too litigious? Or, at least, is 
Australian society on the fast-track to becoming too litigious? These are 
questions that have attracted some — but not enduring — research and 
debate. Certainly, interest was at its highest at the turn of the 21st century, 
when the Australian states were contemplating statutory reforms to tort law. 
This reform effort was in response to a perceived crisis in the insurance 
industry precipitated by a supposed spike in negligence claims and 
compensation awards. Newspapers reported an ‘explosion of negligence cases 
before Australian courts’.4 Politicians complained of ‘excessive litigation’ 
                                                 
1 William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II, IV.ii.72. 
2 Eric Feldman, The Ritual of Rights in Japan: Law, Society, and Health Policy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) 1–15. 
3 Ibid. See also John O Haley, ‘Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems’ (2002) 10 
Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 121, 122.   
4 David Nason, ‘Crisis Can Be Traced to a Snail’, Weekend Australian (Sydney), 30–1 March 
2002, quoted in Sharyn Roach Anleu and Wilfred Prest, ‘Litigation: Historical and 
Contemporary Dimensions’ in Sharyn Roach Anleu and Wilfred Prest (eds), Litigation: Past 
and Present (UNSW Press, 2004) 2, 10. See also Richard Refshauge, ‘Our Litigious Society 
and Its Effect on the Public Sector’ (2002) 105 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 1. 
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caused by the ‘current adversarial litigious legal framework’.5 Judges — both 
judicially6 and extra-judicially7 — complained of crippling case workloads 
due to burgeoning litigation. Scholars8 questioned whether Australia was 
entering an era of American-style ‘lawsuit terrorism’.9 The Australian Law 
Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) investigated whether Australia’s court system 
was in crisis.10 However, since the Australian states enacted civil liability 
statutes,11 the question of litigiousness in Australia has largely withered as an 
area of scholarly12 or policy13 concern.  
                                                 
5 Ted Wright and Angela Melville, ‘Hey, But Who’s Counting? The Metrics and Politics of 
Trends in Civil Litigation’ in Sharyn Roach Anleu and Wilfred Prest (eds), Litigation: Past 
and Present (UNSW Press, 2004) 96, 96–7.  
6 Melchior v Cattanach [2001] QCA 246, [60] (McMurdo P); Lisle v Brice [2002] 2 Qd R 168, 
174 (Thomas JA); Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 213 ALR 249, 251 
(Gleeson CJ); Re Jan Blaszczyk and Secretary, Department of Family and Community 
Services [2005] ATA 1224, [23] (Savage-Davis and Tovey, members); Lade & Co Pty Ltd v 
Black [2006] 2 Qd R 531, 543 (Keane JA). 
7 Kenneth Hayne, ‘Restricting Litigiousness’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 381; David 
Ipp, ‘Taking Responsibility’ (2004) 48(9) Quadrant 16 <http://search.informit.com.au/ 
documentSummary;dn=217740197547211;res=IELLCC>; D A Ipp, ‘Reforms to the 
Adversarial Process in Civil Litigation — Part I’ (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 705; 
James Spigelman, ‘Negligence and Insurance Premiums: Recent Changes in Australian Law’, 
The Spencer Mason Trust Lecture (Auckland, 27 May 2003). 
8 Anleu and Prest, above n 4; Peter Cane, ‘Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal 
Perspective’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 649; Caspar Conde, ‘The Foresight 
Saga: Risk, Litigiousness and Negligence Law Reforms’ (2004) 20(3) Policy 28; Rob Davis, 
‘Exploring the Litigation Explosion Myth’ (2002) 49 Plaintiff 4; Rob Davis, ‘The Tort Law 
Crisis’ (2002) 25(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 865; Refshauge, above n 4; 
Wright and Melville, above n 5.  
9 Dennis Prager, ‘Here’s an Idea, Let’s Bean All the Lawyers’, LA Times (Los Angeles), 9 
August 2001, B15. 
10 ALRC, Reforming Justice: A Review of the Federal Justice System, Report No 89 (2000). 
See further David Weisbrot, ‘Reform of the Civil Justice System and Economic Growth: 
Australian Experience’ (2003) 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 235; David Weisbrot and 
Ian Davis, ‘Litigation and the Federal Civil Justice System’ in Sharyn Roach Anleu and 
Wilfred Prest (eds), Litigation: Past and Present (UNSW Press, 2004) 122.  
11 See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). 
12 For more recent scholarship addressing litigation and litigiousness in Australia, see Kylie 
Burns, ‘Distorting the Law: Politics, Media and the Litigation Crisis: An Australian 
Perspective’ (2007) 15 Torts Law Journal 195; Bobette Wolski, ‘Reform of the Civil Justice 
System Two Decades Past — Implications for the Legal Profession and for Law Teachers’ 
(2009) 21(3) Bond Law Review 192; Bobette Wolski ‘Reform of the Civil Justice System 25 
Years Past: (In)adequate Responses from Law Schools and Professional Associations? (and 
How Best to Change the Behaviour of Lawyers)’ (2011) 40 Common Law World Review 40.   
13 For a recent policy speech addressing litigation levels in Australia, see Nicola Roxon, 
‘Speech to the New South Wales Bar Association Alternative Dispute Resolution Workshop’ 
(4 August 2012) <http://www.lawchat.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Roxon-dispute-
resolution-speech-NSW-Bar.pdf>. 
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This article seeks to re-open the debate about Australian litigiousness. The 
rationale for doing so is that the current literature provides only partial and 
incomplete answers to the question ‘Are Australians too litigious?’ For 
example, the literature makes it clear that claims of an Australian embracing 
of American-style excessive legalism are based on unreliable data and 
selective anecdotes.14 Quantitative studies15 amply demonstrate that 
Australia’s system of civil justice is not in crisis; indeed, litigation rates have 
been consistently falling since the turn of the 21st century.16 But litigiousness 
— or the ‘fondness’17 for law — is a cultural question: it concerns a society’s 
appetite for law; its preparedness to invoke formal law to articulate claims, 
defend rights and resolve disputes. As such, it is a qualitative, not a 
quantitative, issue.  
The article turns to the comparative law literature for lessons on the 
possibilities and pitfalls involved in the making of such qualitative claims 
about litigation and litigiousness. In particular, it highlights the contrasting 
cases of the United States and Japan. The article argues that, since 
litigiousness is difficult to measure directly, cultural stereotypes persist in 
much popular and academic literature — the stereotypes of a rights-obsessed, 
litigation-loving America and a socially harmonious, litigation-averse Japan. 
Comparative law scholars, however, strongly contest — and, often, outright 
reject — these populist impressions.  
These comparative law findings have implications for understanding 
litigiousness in Australia. Two contrasting images currently compete to define 
Australian identity. The first is that Australians are laid-back, friendly and 
easy-going, an image projected in such Australian vernacular expressions as a 
‘fair go’, ‘she’ll be right, mate’ and ‘no worries’. The second, popularised in 
the mass media, is that Australians are becoming too ‘American’ in their 
approach to rights and litigation.18 On this second view, the Australian legal 
system is heading for crisis. More than that, Americanisation may spell the 
decline of society, as citizens prioritise their individual rights over their 
collective responsibilities.19 This article explores how commentators seek to 
correlate these conflicting impressions about Australian identity with 
Australian litigiousness. It concludes by suggesting that the better view might 
lie somewhere between these extremes.  
                                                 
14 Wright and Melville, above n 5, 100, 111, 113.  
15 ALRC, above n 10; Wright and Melville, above n 5.  
16 Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2011 (2011) Table 7A.4. 
17 Hayne, above n 7, 381. 
18 Davis, ‘The Tort Law Crisis’, above n 8, 865–6. 
19 Refshauge, above n 4, 4; cf Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of 
Political Discourse (The Free Press, 1991) 9, 16, 107. 
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The first part of this article introduces the contesting definitions of 
litigiousness and the contrasting views on its social and economic utility. The 
second part explores the cultural assumptions typically made about strong 
legal consciousness in the United States and weak legal consciousness in 
Japan. It also surveys some of the critical scholarly reactions to these 
assumptions. Finally, the article applies these ideas to the Australian case, 
concluding that Australians are neither unduly diffident nor overly 
enthusiastic about invoking the law to resolve their disputes.  
II LITIGATION: GOOD OR EVIL?  
Let us return to modern-day Hamlet’s dilemma. The question he posed for 
himself — one that many modern citizens similarly pose for themselves when 
confronted with conflict or injustice — raises a set of complex questions 
about the social value of litigation. Is litigation a good because it promotes 
individual rights and a healthy liberal democracy?20 Or is it a disease 
crippling civil society by privileging selfishness over community?21 Does 
litigation provide just compensation for those who are wronged? Or does it 
precipitate spikes in insurance premiums that threaten professional services 
and public events?22  
This is the nub of the litigiousness debate. And it is a contentious one. Indeed, 
it is so highly charged that there is not even agreement over what litigiousness 
means. For Feldman, for example, litigiousness is the willingness to assert 
legal rights.23 For Hayne, a Justice of the High Court of Australia, 
litigiousness ‘suggests an eagerness to go to law or even a fondness for the 
process’.24 For Haley, litigiousness is the gauge by which we measure the 
efficacy of law in directing social behaviour.25 Each definition has its own 
point of emphasis. In the first, litigiousness is about rights assertion; in the 
second, it is about over-use or abuse of the legal process; in the third (and the 
widest), it is about law’s relevance to social order. A compromise position 
might be to define litigiousness as the extent to which people are both 
conscious of the law and prepared to engage in formal legal processes. 
Litigious people are those who frame their disputes in legal, adversarial terms; 
non-litigious people are those who prefer to resolve their complaints through 
                                                 
20 Stewart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change 
(Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 2004) xvii. 
21 Leon Kass, ‘Is There a Right to Die?’ (1993) 23(1) Hastings Centre Report 34, 34. 
22 Spigelman, above n 7, cited in Conde, above n 8, 29. 
23 Feldman, above n 2, 1.  
24 Hayne, above n 7, 381. 
25 Haley, above n 3, 122.  
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informal means, such as negotiations or discussions, because they prefer to 
preserve relationships rather than rupture them.  
At first blush, this difference over definition might reflect different value 
judgments about the social value of litigation. Thus, Haley and Feldman see it 
as a good; Hayne, as an evil. In fact, it is more complex than that. Hayley and 
Feldman, as comparative lawyers, are attempting to explain low levels of 
litigation in Japan, especially by American standards. They seek to defend 
Japan against the charge that its legal system is failing its people. By contrast, 
Hayne, as a serving Australian judge, sees litigation every day of his 
professional life and presumably is concerned that it does not spin out of 
control. There is a strong imperative for him to do so because, as a judge, he 
sees first-hand the costs of litigation (both financial and emotional) and 
believes that its over-use outweighs its benefits to democracy, freedom and 
social justice.26 He is not the only judicial officer to think so.27  
Litigiousness is also a barometer of a nation’s economic health. According to 
the prevailing orthodoxy, law, lawyers and litigation are both essential to, and 
a burden on, the economy. Too little rights-assertion points to a weakness in 
the legal infrastructure that is necessary to support a market economy. Law-
and-development theorists have long posited that a strong legal system is 
essential if a stable and predictable environment for investment and a 
transparent and efficient system for enforcing property rights and investment 
decisions is to be delivered.28 Too much law, however, is a drag on economic 
growth. Indeed, empirical studies have shown an inverse relationship between 
the number of lawyers and the vibrancy of the economy. The explanation for 
this is that lawyers, unlike entrepreneurs and engineers, do not generate 
wealth; they are rent-seekers who add complexity and other costs to the 
transaction of business.29  
                                                 
26 Hayne, above n 7, 382. 
27 See cases referred to above n 6.  
28 For a summary of the theoretical literature linking law and economic development, see 
Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Introduction: A Framework for Analysis of Legal Institutions in East 
Asia’ in Kanishka Jayasuriya (ed), Law, Capitalism and Power in East Asia: The Rule of Law 
and Legal Institutions (Routledge, 1999) 1, 3–7.  
29 Derek C Bok, ‘A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training’ (1983) 33 Journal of Legal 
Education 570, 572–4, cited in Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, ‘Law’s Dominion and the 
Market for Legal Elites in Japan’ (2003) 23(2) Law and Policy in International Business 451, 
452. 
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III COMPARATIVE LITIGIOUSNESS AND POPULAR CULTURE 
The challenge for any liberal society, then, is to keep litigation levels in a state 
of balance: too much undermines social cohesion and economic activity; too 
little threatens social justice and economic stability. But where or how to 
strike this optimum balance is extremely complex. This is largely because 
litigiousness is difficult to measure and compare directly.30 For one, it is an 
open question whether litigiousness is indicated by simply filing legal 
proceedings, proceeding to trial, or concluding a dispute with a judicially 
determined outcome.31 For another, 
variations in institutional conditions, including court and professional 
structures, procedural and substantive rules, as well as recording practices, 
make it extremely difficult to compare litigation rates across national 
boundaries in a valid and meaningful fashion.32  
Given the complications associated with collecting, validating and comparing 
quantitative data, it is not surprising that much comparative commentary on 
litigiousness resorts to cultural portrayals. Take the United States, for 
example. For Australians, it is tempting to derive clues about American 
litigiousness from American popular culture.33 After all, American sitcoms 
and dramas appear nightly on Australian television screens; Hollywood 
movies dominate theatrical releases; and American pop, rock, hip-hop and rap 
feature heavily on Australian music charts. A survey of American popular 
culture quickly reveals that law and rights-assertion are dominant plot points 
and themes. From To Kill a Mockingbird (1962) to The Lincoln Lawyer 
(2011), American movies depict lawyers as heroes. From LA Law (1986–
1992) to The Good Wife (2010–), American television uses the court-room to 
debate contemporary social and political issues. And from Bob Dylan’s 
Blowin’ in the Wind (1963) to Christina Aguilera’s Beautiful (2003), 
American popular music lyrics frequently champion civil rights. Indeed, many 
scholars do argue that American popular culture reveals central truths about 
American legal culture.34 And the message is that Americans are over-reliant 
on law. As Davis argues, ‘the meme [is] that the legal system has gone mad. 
That ‘Santa Claus’ judges have encouraged a culture in which everyone feels 
there is no injury without blame, and no blame without a claim.’35 Others 
                                                 
30 Anleu and Prest, above n 4, 6–8.  
31 Ibid 6. 
32 Ibid 8.  
33 See, eg, Kathy Laster with Krista Breckweg and John King, The Drama of the Courtroom 
(Federation Press, 2000).  
34 Lawrence M Friedman, ‘Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture’ (1989) 98(8) Yale Law Review 
1579.  
35 Davis, ‘The Tort Law Crisis’, above n 8, 866. 
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agree: the incidence of law-suits is ‘exploding’.36 Litigation is a form of 
warfare37 and Americans are ‘gorged’38 on legal rights:  
American rights talk is set apart by the way that rights, in our standard 
formulation, tend to be presented as absolute, individual, and independent 
of any necessary relation to responsibilities … [W]e have observed a 
tendency to formulate important issues in terms of rights; a bent for stating 
rights claims in a stark, simple, and absolute fashion; an image of the rights-
bearer as radically free, self-determining, and self-sufficient; and the 
absence of well-developed responsibility talk … and a consequent 
carelessness regarding the environments that human beings and societies 
require in order to flourish.39 
Other scholars are less sure. Ramseyer and Rasmusen, for example, admit that 
litigation in the United States is more voluminous than in other advanced 
economies — but not by much.40 The ratio of law suits between the United 
States and the United Kingdom, for example, is less than the ratio between the 
United Kingdom and Canada. The Americans have fewer judges than the 
French. And although there are more lawyers per capita in the United States 
than anywhere else in the world, Australia is not very far behind.41 Other 
analysts go further and argue that American popular culture misrepresents real 
American legal culture. According to their empirical studies, Americans 
invoke the law only rarely, most preferring to resolve their disputes using 
non-legal means.42  
                                                 
36 Walter K Olsen, The Litigation Explosion: What Happened when America Unleashed the 
Lawsuit (Truman Talley Books, 1995). 
37 Prager, above n 9.  
38 Feldman, above n 2, 2. 
39 Glendon, above n 19, 9, 107. 
40 J Mark Ramseyer and Eric B Rasmusen, ‘Are Americans More Litigious? Some Quantitative 
Evidence’ in F H Buckley (ed), The American Illness: Essays on the Rule of Law (Yale 
University Press, 2011) 1, 27.  
41 Ibid.  
42 See, eg, Marc Galanter, ‘Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t 
Know (and Think We Know) about our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society’ (1983) 
31 University of California Law Review 4; Carol J Greenhouse, Praying for Justice: Faith, 
Order, and Community in an American Town (Cornell University Press, 1986); Laura Nader, 
‘A Litigious People’ (1988) 22(5) Law and Society Review 1017; Robert C Ellickson, Order 
without Law; How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press, 1991); 
M P Baumgartner, ‘On the Overlegalized Conception of Modern Society’ (1993) 22(3) 
Contemporary Sociology 336; Carol J Greenhouse, Barbara Yngvesson and David M Engel, 
Law and Community in Three American Towns (Cornell University Press, 1994); Robert L 
Nelson, ‘Ideology, Scholarship, and Sociolegal Change: Lessons from Galanter and the 
“Litigation Crisis”’ (1998) 21(5) Law and Society Review 677. 
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Japan, by contrast, is said to be a non-litigious society. Currently, 30 516 
lawyers serve a population of 127 million people — about 1 for every 4000 
citizens.43 Nearly 30 per cent of Japan’s court districts have one lawyer (or 
none) practising in the region. Large commercial law firms are uncommon.44   
With so few lawyers, litigation rates are very low. In the mid-1990s, for 
example, there were only 9.3 cases per 1000 people in Japan compared to 
123.2 cases in Germany, 74.5 in the United States, 64.4 in the United 
Kingdom, and 40.3 in France.45 Even by Asian standards, this rate is low. 
Based on statistics for new civil cases filed for trial in district courts in Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan in 1995–1996, South Korea had five times as many 
filings and Taiwan about twice as many.46 Some commentators claim that 
litigation rates are steadily increasing in Japan, especially since the beginning 
of the 21st century.47 However, others explain that most of the increase is 
attributable to the surge in expedited debt recovery cases following the 
bursting of the economic bubble. They note that ordinary contested cases — a 
better barometer of litigiousness — still remain at relatively low levels.48  
Why is the rate of litigation so much lower in Japan compared to other 
modern democratic economies? One of the more popular explanations is the 
cultural theory of Japanese civil justice. Low levels of litigation are attributed 
to Japanese national traits of harmony and groupism.49 As far back as the 
1960s, Japanese socio-legal scholar Takeyoshi Kawashima argued that this 
pre-modern cultural emphasis on community harmony over individual 
interests accounted for the low demand for legal professional services. As 
Japan moves inexorably to embrace a Western-style modernity, Kawashima 
predicted, more Japanese would eventually accept litigation as a means to 
                                                 
43 ‘Too Many Lawyers in Japan, Says Ministry of Internal Affairs’, Majirox News (online), 23 
April 2012 <http://www.majiroxnews.com/2012/04/23/too-many-lawyers-in-japan-says-
ministry-of-internal-affairs/>. 
44 Bruce Aronson, ‘The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan’ (2007) 21 Columbia Journal of 
Asian Law 45, 49.  
45 Iwao Sato, ‘Judicial Reform in Japan in the 1990s: Increase of the Legal Profession, 
Reinforcement of Judicial Functions and Expansion of the Rule of Law (2002) 5(1) Social 
Science Japan Journal 71, 71. 
46 Haley, above n 3, 124. 
47 Tom Ginsburg and Glenn Hoetker, ‘The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of 
Japan’s Turn to Litigation’ (2006) 35(1) Journal of Legal Studies 31. 
48 Takao Tanase (trans Luke Nottage and Leon Wolff), Community and the Law: A Critical 
Reassessment of American Liberalism and Japanese Modernity (Edward Elgar, 2010) 158.  
49 Kenneth L Port, ‘The Case for Teaching Japanese Law at American Law Schools’ (1994) 43 
De Paul Law Review 643, 659–70. 
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resolve their disputes.50 Several scholars have endorsed Kawashima’s thesis, 
although with different normative conclusions. For example, Chin and 
Lawson51 agree that the Japanese are culturally averse to law. Japanese 
attitudes to law have been shaped by geographic isolation, ethnic 
homogeneity and religious thought. Instead of law, the authors submit, non-
legal forces ensure social order. Like Kawashima, the authors suggest that 
only social change will bring about a change of legal consciousness; but 
whether or not change occurs, they evaluate Japanese attitudes to law quite 
positively as ‘law of the subtle mind’. By contrast, Inoue assesses Japanese 
legal culture more negatively. The communitarian ethic — which carries with 
it an aversion to the individualism of rights-talk — is a threat to liberalism, 
Inoue warns.52  
Comparative law researchers have strongly criticised the cultural explanation 
for litigation levels in Japan and have offered alternative explanations. One 
prominent theory stresses institutional factors over cultural attributes. 
Specifically, this theory points to a number of institutional disincentives to 
litigation within the legal system.53 For example, Hayley, while 
acknowledging that Japanese file relatively fewer civil suits compared to 
citizens in other industrialised countries, points to evidence that the Japanese 
are not reticent about asserting their legal rights. Rather, according to Hayley, 
institutional incapacity — few lawyers and judges,54 the discontinuous nature 
of trials, and an inadequate range of remedies and enforcement powers55 — 
establishes a barrier to bringing suit in Japan. Other institutional barriers 
include a lack of pre-trial discovery procedures, high contingency fees, 
prohibitive court costs and the absence of a jury system.56  
                                                 
50 Takeyoshi Kawashima, ‘Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan’ in Arthur von Mehren 
(ed), Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society (Harvard University Press, 1963) 
41. 
51 Chin Kim and Craig M Lawson, ‘The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese 
Conception of Law’ (1979) 28 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 461. 
52 Tatsuo Inoue, ‘The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking through the Window of 
Japan’ (1993) Brigham Young University Law Review 517.  
53 Port, above n 49, 659–70. 
54 John O Haley, ‘The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant’ (1978) 4(2) Journal of Japanese Studies 
359, 380. 
55 Ibid 387. 
56 Nobutoshi Yamanouchi and Samuel J Cohen, ‘Understanding the Incidence of Litigation in 
Japan: A Structural Analysis’ (1991) 25(2) The International Lawyer 443. Japan introduced a 
quasi-jury system in 2009; however, this is more accurately described as a ‘lay judge’ system 
where citizens join professional judges in deciding questions of fact and law and is, at any 
rate, restricted to serious criminal matters: see Douglas G Levin, ‘Saiban-in Seido: Lost in 
Translation? How the Source of Power Underlying Japan’s Proposed Lay Assessor System 
May Determine its Fate’ (2011) 10(1) Asia-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 199.  
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Yet another counter-explanation is that the Japanese civil justice system is 
politically manipulated. According to this view, political elites — notably, the 
bureaucracy — manage the pace and direction of social change by 
channelling disputes away from the courts and into the hands of government-
annexed informal dispute resolution facilities. Adherents of this view submit 
that lower levels of litigation in Japan have nothing to do with a cultural 
aversion to law; they are more the result of deliberate conservative 
government policy.57 Japanese political conservatives prefer informal 
resolution of disputes because, it is submitted, they view litigation as a threat 
to the political and social status quo and, therefore, take calculated steps to 
discourage litigation.58 
A more controversial explanation for low litigation rates in Japan is advanced 
by law and economics scholars who explain rates of litigation in terms of 
behaviourist economics. On this view, Japanese prefer to settle because 
damages are predictable and settlement is the cheaper option. It is more 
economically ‘rational’ (or cost effective) — to bargain in the shadow of the 
law rather than pursue litigation. Law and economics scholars argue that a 
Japanese cultural aversion to law is pure myth.59 Ramseyer and Nakazato, for 
example, contend that the Japanese preference to settle cases out of court is 
not culturally pre-determined nor compelled by structural impediments in the 
legal system.60 Japanese settle because they can predict what damages they 
might get if they pursued their dispute in court and, therefore, simply bargain 
‘in the shadow of the law’. Settling is cheaper and quicker than prosecuting a 
case to trial. This shows that the Japanese are bound by rationality, not 
culture, because they maximise — rather than forsake — their self-interest. 
And it suggests that the Japanese legal system works, because, if disputants 
are settling their disputes in light of expected litigated outcomes, then clearly 
law is structuring behaviour.61 Consider, for example, noise pollution from 
karaoke machines, a big problem in congested Japan.62 According to case law 
databases, only about 40 disputes have ever been brought before the Japanese 
courts. By contrast, nearly 100 000 cases are heard each year by pollution 
complaint counsellors who offer an informal dispute resolution service 
                                                 
57 Port, above n 49, 670. 
58 Frank K Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan (Harvard University Press, 1987) 
16–27, 124–65. 
59 Port, above n 49, 661–2, 668–9. 
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established by the dispute law. Under the law, counsellors have strong, judge-
like powers to consult with residents, investigate pollution incidents, and 
provide guidance and advice. Filing a complaint involves no direct monetary 
cost, does not preclude filing a concurrent (or subsequent) law suit, and allows 
complaints to be heard and dealt with relatively swiftly due to the lack of 
formalities.  
IV LITIGIOUSNESS AND AUSTRALIAN POPULAR CULTURE 
Culture might also allure as an explanation of Australian attitudes to law. 
Consider the two quintessentially Australian expressions ‘she’ll be right, 
mate’ and ‘no worries’. It matters little whether most people actually use these 
expressions or revert to American vernacular such as ‘cool’ or ‘awesome’ 
instead. What does matter is that the expressions project images of who we 
are or, more accurately, who we think we are as Australians: laid-back, 
informal and easy-going with an anti-authoritarian streak and jocular 
contempt for elites. Like most cultural assumptions, however, this self-image 
is open to critical scrutiny. For example, Australians are not as laid-back as 
they might like to think. Indeed, studies show that Australians work some of 
the longest hours of any workers in the industrialised world.63 Furthermore, 
the easy-going nature of Australians does not necessarily extend to welcoming 
outsiders. Immigration policy, for example, has long been a sore point in 
Australian external relations, dating back to the post-WW2 White Australia 
Policy64 and extending to today’s political preference for off-shore processing 
of asylum-seekers. Despite these apparent contradictions, this self-image is 
central to the Australian identity. Certainly, it saturates our popular culture. 
Prime-time television shows, for example, celebrate low-key family life in 
middle-class suburbia. Neighbours and Home and Away, two of the longest 
running soaps on Australian television, illustrate this perfectly. The 
construction of this self-image through popular culture is to be contrasted 
with: American soap operas which focus on the life of the extravagantly 
wealthy (Young and the Restless, Days of Our Lives, Dallas and, more 
recently, Revenge); British serials that portray the battles of working-class 
existence (Eastenders and Coronation Street); and Japanese television series 
that prioritise the value of work by situating the drama within generic office 
settings with white collar protagonists (such as Tokyo Love Story).  
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What insights does this offer for litigation behaviour in Australia? A cultural 
analysis would tend to suggest that Australians are — or, at least, should be 
— ambivalent about the law. With the Australian cultural predisposition to 
informality, mateship and the ‘fair go’, most Australians would be expected to 
prefer to resolve their conflicts informally rather than through legal means; to 
preserve their personal and professional relationships rather than place them at 
risk through financially and emotionally draining litigation; and settle their 
disputes using an innate sense of justice rather than abstract legal rules.  
Popular culture reinforces this expectation. In contrast to the position in the 
United States, Australian television and film make infrequent use of lawyers 
as characters and court-room battles as dramatic plot points.65 Where they do, 
the legal process is either mocked for being un-Australian or criticised for 
destroying personal relationships and lives. In The Castle (1997), for example, 
an ordinary family sues a developer to prevent the developer resuming its land 
to extend the Melbourne Airport. The movie pokes fun at the law, 
highlighting how alien court-room procedures and legal language are to the 
film’s hero, a well-meaning, likeable and community spirited Aussie battler. 
In the ABC series Sea Change (1998–2000), a corporate lawyer in a large, 
urban law firm quits her job and finds personal happiness in a coastal 
community, serving as the local magistrate. A parade of quirky characters 
appear in her courtroom, whose complaints, she finds, are usually better 
resolved through informal, community-affirming strategies than formal fines 
or custodial sentences. More recently, the ABC eight-part mini-series The 
Slap (2011) comprised a minor story line in which a young mother brings 
formal charges against her friend’s husband for slapping her young son at a 
family barbeque. The lead-up to her court case places pressure on her 
marriage and strains her relationships with her friends, and the court case ends 
in disaster when she is humiliated on the witness stand. Australian popular 
culture, in short, largely neglects law as worthy of narrative attention and, 
when it does, treats it with comical or derisive scorn. The thesis is clear: 
formal law is not a good cultural fit with the Australian identity. 
The alternative view is that litigiousness, far from being alien to Australian 
cultural values, is actually spinning out of control. If this is occurring, it might 
be attributable to the cultural ‘Americanisation’ of Australian society.66 
Australians, some suggest, are becoming more willing to assert their rights; 
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indeed, ‘the exercise and assertion of rights is legitimated and increasingly 
encouraged’.67 They are more prepared to complain; the rise in watchdogs and 
complaints-handling bodies such as the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, the Insurance Ombudsman and the Banking Ombudsman, 
facilitates this option.68 And Australians are more inclined to resort to 
litigation to effect social and economic change instead of relying on political 
action or advocacy.69 In particular, they increasingly look to the courts for 
financial support when struck by misfortune: 
All too often the courts are asked to act as an avenue to welfare rather than 
compensation. Guy Swain was left a quadriplegic after diving into a 
sandbank at Bondi beach ... Kerry Melchior sought and was awarded the 
costs of raising her (perfectly healthy) son Jordan, who was born after a 
botched sterilisation procedure. Diane Burns sued Hoyts after she was 
injured trying to sit in a cinema seat that had folded back. And Rosalie Cole, 
who had a blood alcohol content of 0.238gm per 100ml when she was run 
over by a four wheel drive, sought compensation from the South Tweed 
Heads Rugby Football Club for her injuries. All this serves to create … [a] 
risk-averse society.70  
Three key social institutions paint litigiousness as a problem in Australia. The 
first is the mass media. As Refshauge notes, television news and newspaper 
reports are awash with stories about litigation and legal risk: from cases of 
disabled children suing schools to allow them to study alongside able-bodied 
children to reports of local councils removing coconut trees because of the 
risk that coconuts might fall and injure pedestrians.71 The second is the 
insurance industry. The Insurance Council of Australia, as the peak 
organisation representing the insurance industry, has pointed to statistical 
evidence that Australia was, at one point, the second most litigious country in 
the world after the United States.72 In its submission to a governmental 
inquiry on personal injury law and public liability insurance in 2002, it argued 
that the Australian legal system was reaching crisis point because too many 
Australians wanted ‘compensation for any loss, which used to be considered 
fate, luck or an accident’.73  
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The third institution warning about the dangers of litigiousness is the 
judiciary. Several judges, in their judgments or in extra-curial speeches or 
articles, criticise over-litigiousness in Australia and the burden this is placing 
on the courts. Former Chief Justice of the Australian High Court, Sir Gerard 
Brennan, considered in 1997 that the Australian civil justice system was ‘in 
crisis’.74 Gleeson CJ in 2005 warned that Australia was becoming ‘a rights-
conscious and litigious society, in which people are apt to demand reasons for 
any decision by which their rights are affected’.75 David Ipp, former justice in 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal, argued in 1994 that clogged courts 
were leading to ‘dissatisfaction with the court system’ and ‘erosion of 
confidence in the justice system’.76 Queensland judges have been especially 
scathing in their criticism. In Lade & Co Pty Ltd v Black, Keane JA remarked:  
In a litigious society, enthusiasm for litigation may, in some cases, 
overwhelm rational consideration of whether ‘the game is worth the candle’ 
with the unfortunate result that the costs expended by the parties upon the 
litigation vastly exceed the monetary value of the matters in dispute.77  
In Melchior v Cattanach, McMurdo P noted:  
[I]n Australian society, we have become accustomed to claimants pursuing 
claims against insured friends and relatives; we are no longer shocked when 
a husband sues his wife in a motor vehicle accident case for damages for 
personal injuries, children sue parents for whom they work when injured in 
the work place or students sue their school for damages arising from 
negligence.78 
In Leslie v Price, Thomas JA raised strongly worded concerns about the ease 
with which injured Australians could sue for compensation:  
[Australian law] … increasingly permit[s] unrealistic results in [personal 
injury] cases, in both liability and quantum. Today it is commonplace that 
claimants with relatively minor disabilities are awarded lump sums greater 
than the claimant (or defendant) could save in a lifetime. The generous 
application of these rules is producing a litigious society and has already 
spawned an aggressive legal industry. I am concerned that the common law 
is being developed to a stage that already inflicts too great a cost upon the 
community both economic and social. 
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In a compensation-conscious community citizens look for others to blame. 
The incentive to recover from injury is reduced. Self-reliance becomes a 
scarce commodity. These are destructive social forces. Also much 
community energy is wasted in divisive and non-productive work. A further 
consequence is the raising of costs of compulsory third party, employers’ 
liability, public risk and professional indemnity insurance premiums. These 
costs are foisted upon sectors of the public and in the end upon the public at 
large. I would prefer that these problems be rectified by the development of 
a more affordable common law system, but in recent times its development 
has been all in one direction — more liability and more damages. 
I express these concerns in this particular case because authority constrains 
me to participate in pushing the boundaries further when I think that the 
time has already been reached when courts should be seriously 
reconsidering the formulation of firmer control devices than those that 
currently exist. I fear that we are developing a creature we can no longer 
control.79 
V CRITICISMS 
The case put by the media, the insurance industry and the judiciary is a 
powerful one. But how convincing is it? For example, the media attracts its 
audience through attention-grabbing stories. Would it not be natural for it to 
highlight high-stakes and unusual cases rather than describe the ‘routine’80 
contract, torts and property claims that are the bread-and-butter of the court 
system? Further, as Davis asks, is it not in the interests of the insurance 
industry to undermine plaintiff rights because they place pressure on 
insurance affordability and therefore dampen consumer demand for insurance 
products?81 And, finally, Australian judges decide law suits every day in their 
professional lives. When they make claims about litigious behaviour, are they 
not relying on an unrepresentative — and therefore unreliable — sample of 
the Australian population? 
The question of Australian litigiousness was independently tested by the 
ALRC. In its 2000 report on the civil justice system, it conducted the first 
nation-wide empirical investigation into litigation rates in Australia82 and 
found no ‘explosion’ in litigation rates.83 Although case-loads were increasing 
in some jurisdictions and civil cases were generally becoming more complex 
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and taking longer to resolve, this lent insufficient weight to the view pushed 
by the media, the legal profession and the judiciary that the legal system was 
on the verge of crisis. Indeed, according to later studies examining civil 
filings, litigation has, in general, been declining since the late 1990s.84 More 
recent statistics confirm that litigation continues to decline in the first decade 
of the 2000s:  
 
 NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT Total 
2009–
2010 
2931 3360 1833 2680 1879 2164 1227 3217 2687 
2008–
2009 
3119 3591 2279 2781 2032 2327 1671 2964 2926 
2007–
2008 
3121 3703 2223 2533 2063 2212 1917 2808 2925 
2006–
2007 
3216 3811 2306 2546 2256 2418 1791 3077 3024 
2005–
2006 
2295 3890 2509 2678 2430 2543 2407 3136 3190 
 
Table 1: Lodgements, civil, per 100 000 people (all civil courts 
excluding the family courts, the Federal Magistrates Court and the 
coroners’ courts)85 
 
Further, according to a 2011 comparative study drawing on 2007 court data, 
Ramseyer and Rasmusen found that Australians file nearly four times fewer 
civil law suits (1542 per 100 000 people) than Americans (5806 per 100 000 
people) and, in an interesting twist, even fewer than the Japanese (1768 per 
100 000 people).86 This study is open to question, however, because the 
authors’ estimation of Australian court filings (1542 per 100 000 people is 
almost half that of official Australian government estimations (3024 per 
100 000 people: see Table 1 above). Yet, even if adjusted, Australian 
litigation levels are still significantly lower than those in the United States; 
indeed, they are closer to Japanese than American rates.  
VI CONCLUSION 
So how litigious are Australians? Do Australians seek informal resolution of 
their conflicts, in order to preserve their social relationships, or are they quick 
to assert their rights? Which prevailing view of Australian identity best 
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explains Australians’ attitude to law? Put differently, if something goes 
wrong, do you expect a ‘she’ll be right, mate’ or a ‘she has rights, mate’?  
Access to lawyers is not an issue. Indeed, according to Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen, Australia has nearly the same number of lawyers per capita as the 
United States.87 But the data on civil court lodgements clearly show that 
Australians do not necessarily retain them at the same rate as Americans — 
or, if they do, not primarily for the purposes of contesting their disputes in the 
courts. Nevertheless, there are enough lodgements to show that Australians 
are not unwilling to make use of the courts.  
All this points to the conclusion that culture — or, at least, cultural 
stereotyping — is an unreliable guide to Australian litigating behaviour. Such 
is the key lesson derived from the comparative law work analysing American 
and Japanese attitudes to law. As the Australian quantitative research reveals, 
Australians are neither embracing a new American-style culture of 
litigiousness nor unduly resisting resort to formal law as somehow antithetical 
to inherently Australian values of fair play and common sense. The truth lies 
somewhere in between.  
This opens up rich prospects for further inquiry. If Australian litigiousness lies 
somewhere between the American and Japanese extremes, does this suggest 
that it is a model for other nations to emulate? More importantly, what 
explains the current state of affairs? As this article has pointed out, the 
Australian literature has been effective in debunking the myth of a civil justice 
system in crisis; but it has largely failed to give the reasons why Australians 
are using the courts and formal law at current levels. Perhaps the brief burst of 
scholarly interest in Australian litigiousness, inspired by the release of the 
2000 ALRC report on Australian civil justice, has largely dissipated because it 
was too narrowly focused on the question — now largely rejected — of over-
litigiousness in Australia. This is to be contrasted with the research activity on 
American and Japanese litigation which is not only continuing unabated, but 
is also offering up new explanatory paradigms for continuing or emerging 
trends in each country’s litigation profiles.88   
This suggests an additional lesson that comparative law may have for future 
research into Australian litigiousness. After decades of research, comparative 
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law has revealed a wealth of explanatory models which can be tested in the 
Australian context. The literature on Japanese litigiousness alone offers some 
intriguing theoretical paradigms — cultural, institutional, political and 
economic — that might bear fruit in future empirical studies on Australian 
legal consciousness.  
Law, in short, matters in Australia — but, according to the consensus in the 
literature, not too much. But how does law matter in Australia? To paraphrase 
again from Hamlet, that is the next question. And comparative law is the torch 
that can guide the next generation of scholars into this new scholarly terrain.  
